Introduction
1.1 Majority rule is troublesome if groups choose among more than two options. Suppose Tom, Dick, and Harry must rank A, B, and C. Tom ranks them (A, B, C), Dick (C, A, B), and Harry (B, C, A). Suppose they proceed by taking pairwise majority votes. Yet since A beats B, B beats C, and C beats A, no ranking emerges; instead, we obtain a cycle. This is the Condorcet paradox.
Majority rule, as sketched here, is indeterminate: it does not always deliver a result. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, in one way of thinking about it, generalizes this phenomenon, isolating those features that imply that majority rule sometimes ascribes intransitive preferences to groups.
In light of these results, some argue that majoritarian democracy is conceptually flawed.
My article "Arrow's Theorem, Indeterminacy, and Multiplicity Reconsidered" 1 defends a conception of majoritarian decision making that demonstrates that there is a coherent 1 Ethics 111 (2001): 706-34; I refer to that article as "my earlier article." This article is a response to Donald G. Saari (2003) , "Capturing the 'Will of the People'," Ethics 113 (2003): 333-349. Thanks to Hélène Landemore and Richard Zeckhauser for valuable comments on an earlier draft. I write (A, B, etc.) for rankings, and {A, B, etc.} for sets. Where Saari's notation differs, I substitute mine. I refer to A, B, C as "options." When talking about "rankings," I mean "ordinal rankings," rankings that do not convey any information about options other than to identify other options to which they are preferred To have different names, I refer to the rule introduced here as "majority rule," but argue that the "Condorcet proposal" is what we should mean when talking about majoritarian decision making. While "majority rule" is disqualified by the indeterminacy problem, we do have a coherent account of majoritarian decision making. Note that my discussion, in virtue of being a response, will omit many important issues that arise in this debate; in particular, I ignore considerations about strategic voting altogether, and thus also most considerations that bear on how the two proposed methods do in practice. (By not debating strategic voting, I think I am making a concession to defenders of the Borda count.) majoritarian decision rule. Since my proposal bears affinities to ideas of the Marquis the Condorcet, I call it the Condorcet proposal (often referring to it as "the Proposal"). This proposal solves the indeterminacy problem, as well as the related incoherence problem. 2 I also argue for the multiplicity thesis, the claim that in the same situation, different methods may be reasonable.
So some people will be "losers" relative to what they would receive had another, equally reasonable method, been adopted. This claim, I argue, does not undermine common justifications of democracy. All this is consistent with skepticism about the range of settings where majoritarian decision making should apply. In particular, I hold the following two claims: (1) Whenever it is reasonable to use the Proposal, it is reasonable to use a competing rule, the Borda count (cf. section 2). (2) There are situations where more information should be aggregated than mere rankings, and there are situations where the decision should be made in non-aggregative ways (say, by fair-division methods). 3 So while majoritarian decision making is conceptually sound, it never is the uniquely reasonable decision rule. But again, I do not take that to be detrimental to democracy.
1.2 In his article "Capturing the 'Will of the People'," Donald Saari claims my "main points vary between questionable and wrong" (p 333). Saari is a prolific and insightful contributor to voting theory from a mathematical perspective, and a supporter of the Borda count. The disagreement between Saari and myself, I think, is important and complex. What is at issue is what social choice theory teaches about democracy, and how to reason soundly about insights of formal social choice theory. As I understand Saari, our views relate as follows:
(1) Saari grants that the Condorcet proposal is a coherent, general conception of majoritarian decision making. While showing this was one of the "main points" of my earlier article, Saari does not think of this as a claim in need of much argument.
(2) Saari argues that the Proposal, though it may be coherent, is implausible and in particular does not solve the indeterminacy problem.
(3) Saari also argues that the multiplicity thesis fails. The Borda count turns out to be the preferred voting rule, at least among methods that aggregate preferences.
(4) In light of (2) and (3), Saari takes critics of majoritarian democracy to be vindicated.
Saari argues that majoritarian democracy is flawed although majoritarian decision making is sound (since it is implausible), and because the multiplicity thesis is false (since the Borda count is the best rule for aggregating rankings). I argue that majoritarian democracy is sound because there is a coherent majoritarian method, and that democracy is vindicated although the multiplicity thesis holds. The falsity of the multiplicity thesis does not defeat democracy.
In short, Saari argues that the Borda count is the preferred method of aggregating rankings, and solves all problems of social choice mentioned here. Condorcet and Borda themselves, French noblemen in troubled times, debated these matters already in the late 18 th century, a golden age of reflection on group rationality. Yet since I merely announce Condorcet a contender whereas Saari pronounces Borda a champion (my position opposing parallel claims about the Proposal as well), our disagreement does not fully re-instantiate "Condorcet vs. Borda."
Fortunately, most terms of the debate are clear. Point (1) captures a shared starting point, the difference consisting in views on how much argument it takes to show that this indeed is the starting point. I respond to (2) and (3), and thus also to (4). Addressing (2), section 2 introduces the Condorcet proposal and the Borda count, defending the former against Saari's objections.
Addressing (3), section 3 discusses Saari's argument for Borda. Section 4 concludes by assessing where this leaves us regarding justifications of democracy (i.e., addresses point (4)): the multiplicity thesis emerges strengthened, and majoritarian democracy is indeed conceptually sound. Saari's reasoning displays some widespread fallacies, not mathematical fallacies, but fallacies in the reasoning about mathematical insights. His arguments fail, but in ways that teach lessons about the philosophy of social choice and the insights social choice theory offers to democratic theory and that thus are instructive beyond the limits of our disagreement.
The Condorcet Proposal
2.1 This section defends the Condorcet proposal. I first explain both that proposal and the Borda count and what I claim about them. By that time it will be clear how to approach Saari's objections, and discussing them will occupy us for the remainder of this section.
Suppose we must rank m options in a majoritarian manner. The Proposal looks at all m(m-1)/2 pairs among the options and selects one or more of the m! possible rankings in light of these pairwise votes, regardless of cycles. Those votes are the "data," and we ask which ranking Condorcet's Jury Theorem: Supposes it makes sense to speak of being right or wrong about political decisions. Suppose n agents choose between two options; that each has a probability of p>½ of being right; and that their probabilities are independent of each other (i.e., they make up their minds for themselves). Then, as n grows, the probability of a majority's being right approaches 1. Define this distance as the number of pairs with regard to whose ranking they differ. The distance between (A, B, C) and (B, A, C) is 1 since they differ only with regard to {A, B}. A suitable conceptualization for an average of rankings is their median relative to this metric, that is, the ranking minimizing the sum over the distances from the rankings. This median is also the result of the maximum likelihood method and the recommendation of the Proposal. Strikingly, 5 For this generalization cf. Peyton Young, "Condorcet's Theory of Voting", American Political Science Review 82 (1988): 1231-1244. Using the Jury theorem here as only one in two examples has the disadvantage of suggesting that the epistemic framework in social choice is more important than it is: in many situations, after all, it will not make sense to speak of group choices in terms of true and false, and many theorists will deny that it ever does. Yet using the theorem is still useful for our purposes to assess the relative strength to the arguments for Borda and Condorcet, and at any rate, my earlier article emphasizes the limitations of this approach and discusses several other arguments in addition to these two. The reader should keep that in mind.
three methods motivated on different grounds select the same rankings. In particular the fact that the rankings selected by the Condorcet proposal emerge through an intuitively appealing notion of compromise supports the claim that the Proposal is a reasonable aggregation method. As far as aggregating rankings is concerned, Condorcet and Borda are on a par: neither has conclusive arguments against the other, and both rules are reasonable. Saari's second objection exploits the fact that the Proposal may display curious discontinuity phenomena. He construes a case where 17,000 voters maximally support rankings different from observing that the procedure does not deliver a result and taking that to mean that it is indifferent among the rankings obtained by dissolving the source of the indeterminacy (say, by cutting a cycle): no substantive account of indifference is forthcoming in this way. Cyclicity is one way of bringing about indeterminacy, but does not define indeterminacy (cf. Saari, p 336).
Before assessing the third claim (that the
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9 Indeterminacy is always a problem because it leaves the group without any recommendation. Non-uniqueness is not always a problem: maybe what the method tries to accomplish does not entail a unique recommendation. Importantly, the proposal still selects a result if a sequence of pairwise votes leads to a cycle, namely, when the relevant majorities are unequal: not all cases of indeterminacy under sequential pairwise voting become cases of indifference under the proposal.
(A, C, B) and (B, A, C). The addition of one voter might bring about the selection of (A, C, B) as the unique such ranking, whereas the addition of another voter instead triggers the selection of (B, A, C). Saari finds it "difficult to accept that a procedure searches for the 'right ranking' when it certifies radical reversals in the societal outcome -where a candidate drops from top to bottom ranked -with a trivial 'one in 17,001' data change" (p 339 be that the problems Saari diagnoses arise because he seriously underdescribes the situation.
Surely A and C do not capture the "will of the voters," whatever that is. Yet the problem is that the situation is hopelessly underdescribed: neither preferences nor voting options are sufficiently specified for the Proposal to apply. There are three questions at stake, and each of the three positions takes stances on all three: (a) Should salaries be raised? (b) Should classes be enlarged? (c) Should teachers be hired? In what I trust is obvious notation, the Deniers' view is (no, yes, no), the Hirers' is (no, no, yes), and the Raisers' is (yes, yes, no). A beats B because
Deniers and Hirers join forces against the Raisers, but only because A and B are underdescribed:
choosing between A and B is choosing between (no, blank, blank) and (yes, blank, blank) . It is no surprise that the outcome is distorted if the options only partially describe voters' views.
But even if the options were fully specified, the Condorcet proposal would not apply. For instance, the Deniers cannot say whether they prefer "hiring teachers while freezing class sizes and salaries" to "enlarging classes with raises but without hires." We must also fully specify the voters' views. The Proposal, placed as it is in ideal theory, requires a complete description of the problem that specifies each position in terms of a ranking of the three possible views and asks voters about completely specified options. Suppose no other positions are considered: we disregard (say) the view that salaries should be raised, but class sizes should remain fixed, and no teachers should be hired. The Deniers rank (no, yes, no) first, and then split. Suppose 110 RaiseInclined Deniers rank (yes, yes, no) second, and (no, no, yes) third, and suppose the remaining 40 Hiring-Inclined Deniers rank (no, no, yes) second, and (yes, yes, no) last. Similarly, the Hirers split into 140 Raise-Inclined Hirers ranking (no, no, yes) first, (yes, yes, no) second, and (no, yes, no) last, and 210 Denial-Inclined Hirers ranking (no, no, yes) first, (no, yes, no) second, and (yes, yes, no) third. Finally, the Raisers split into 100 Denial-Inclined Raisers ranking (yes, yes, no) first, (no, yes, no) second, and (no, no, yes) third, and 200 Hiring-Inclined Raisers ranking (yes, yes, no) first, (no, no, yes) second, and (no, yes, no) third. Only now can we use the Proposal.
There are six possible rankings and three pairwise votes. The Proposal selects the ranking putting (yes, yes, no) first, (no, no, yes) second, and (no, yes, no) third: the Hiring-Inclined Raisers win.
Since most voters want to help the teachers without incurring double expenses, this outcome has a good claim to capturing the "will of the people," as I trust Saari would agree.
If voters with incompletely described views vote on incompletely described outcomes, the Condocet proposal cannot track the right ranking, and we should not expect it to do so. Saari goes on to explore a related scenario in which also A and C as defined above are selected, but by entirely different majorities. He concludes that "we must worry whether procedures based on simple majority votes -in particular the Condorcet proposal -distort outcomes by inheriting and reflecting this loss of information about the voters' wishes" (p 340). In 3.4, we discuss Saari's objection to reliance on pairwise votes in detail, but for now, let us record that these distortions here arise due to Saari's set-up, not due to the malfunctioning of the Proposal, or through reliance on pairwise votes. Saari commits a "collectivized" version of an error Jim Joyce calls "the single most common fallacy that people commit in the application of decision theory:" 10 in decision-theoretic contexts, this mistake is the underspecification of outcomes, and in voting scenarios it is the underspecification of voters' views or of options they vote on. 
The Borda Count
3.1 Saari uses an in ingenious method of defending the Borda count. He begins by formulating two seemingly innocuous "neutrality criteria," whose acceptance, however, commits us to Borda.
More specifically, Saari defines sets of rankings whose removal from the group should not affect the outcome since those sets constitute a tie:
To illustrate the basic idea, suppose in a two-person comparison that Sally has forty-five supporters while Bill has forty. A way to determine the will of this group is to combine in pairs a Sally supporter with a Bill supporter. Each of these forty pairs defines a tie; the aggregate tie from the forty pairs is broken in Sally's favor because there are five remaining people who support her. Thus information from the profile identifies Sally as representing the will of these people. A way to extract information about voter preferences from a profile, then, is to understand which combinations of preferences define ties. removed. If we look at the situation from the standpoint of disagreements about pairs, we notice that the view that "A is preferred to B" loses one vote; "B is preferred to A" loses two votes; "A is preferred to C" loses one vote, "C is preferred to A" loses one vote, "B is preferred to C" loses one vote, and "C is preferred to B" loses two votes. Three of the six positions lose two votes, and three lose one. For each pair, it is always one view (say, "C is preferred to B") that loses two votes, whereas the opposing view ("B is preferred to C") loses one. This is different for NRR, where each position loses one vote. Thus removing a Condorcet triplet leaves some views about pairs more "damaged" than others. NCR is not neutral with regard to disagreements about pairs.
We have gathered two observations about NCR's neutrality: as far as information about relative standing in rankings is concerned, NCR is neutral, but as far as impact on pairwise disagreements is concerned, it is not. Reflection on pairs leads to a different criterion. 11 Suppose R is a ranking championed by the proposal, and suppose two opposing rankings are removed from the group. Suppose ranking S, different from R, is chosen by the proposal afterwards. Since S and R are different, there must be a set M of pairs with regard to which they differ, and a set N of pairs with regard to which they agree. For instance, for (A, B, C) and (B, C, A), M consists of {A, B} and {A, C}, and N of {B, C}. For each element of M, R and S lose one vote if two opposing rankings are removed since one of the opposing rankings supports R and one supports S. For each member of N, R and S lose one vote as well: for one of the opposing rankings supports them both on each majority rule involving a member of N. So the difference between the number of votes supporting R and the number supporting S remains the same after the opposing pairs have been removed. Thus the proposal cannot champion S. Yet such explanations require commitments regarding the purpose of the aggregation, including statements like "criterion X should be adopted because the purpose of aggregation is such and such," or "X should be adopted because in aggregating rankings we do such and such."
Saari may say (for instance) that NCR is persuasive because no information about the relative standing of candidates across rankings vanishes if we remove Condorcet n-tuples. Yet that is convincing only if the purpose of aggregation is to assess such standing and to rank candidates accordingly. That is what the Borda count does. Borda asks about the support for options across rankings. Such claims make NBR looks implausible ("what is the relevance of pairs and hence of "balanced" sets given what we have said the purpose of aggregation is?"), but without some such claims, NBR cannot be dismissed. On the other hand, one may argue that NBR is plausible because it demands that disagreements about pairs be equally damaged by removing rankings.
Yet that is plausible only if one thinks the purpose of aggregation is to ask which ranking is most supported by pairwise votes, and then NCR has little pull. Just as NCR led to Borda, so NBR leads to Condorcet, who asks about the support for each ranking in pairwise elections. So by justifying his criteria, Saari must give reasons unavailable to the impartial position from which he means to "assess the data." His attempt to analyze "the data" in an allegedly pre-theoretical manner fails. 12 3.3 Both Condorcet and Borda capture plausible ideas about group choice, and each is supported by strong arguments. Each has counterintuitive implications from the standpoint of the other, perhaps even some from its own standpoint. Each conforms to neutrality criteria, and has reasons for endorsing those criteria, rather than others. It is fruitless to press on either method to reveal implications that look odd from the standpoint of the other, but (a) do not look implausible from the standpoint of that rule, or (b) do, on balance, not persuade a defender of that rule to abandon her position. This is the fallacy of overweighting allegedly counterintuitive consequences. We have now identified a symmetric error, which (again for lack of a catchier name) we may call the fallacy of overweighting allegedly independently plausible axioms. This is a fallacy because it is fruitless to show that one rule fails to conform to conditions that look plausible only from the standpoint of the other. Saari seems to commit that error as well. Both fallacies identify some facts about a rule (such as an implication for a given profile, or lack of consistency with some axiom), and declare that those cause devastating problems, without investigating how defenders 19 of that rule may address such claims. Before I suggest what should count as a successful objection to a decision method, let me press on Saari's argument a bit more.
That Saari would commit this second error is peculiar. For he insists that his approach avoids precisely that error. Since this is an area where the terms of the debate seem unclear, I
elaborate on why I think Saari commits an error that he attributes to others. At the beginning of his article, Saari says that "it is accurate to interpret my [Saari's] comments as questioning whether the traditional approach used by this field, and by Risse, is bankrupt" (p 335). What is this "traditional approach" from which Saari's differs? He tells us in section IV:
A standard approach is to postulate desirable properties for election procedures and then search for methods which possess them. Stated in another manner, the 'axiomatic approach' specifies measures for election and decision methods and identifies which procedures maximize the measure. This is the approach embraced by Risse. [p 341]
He goes on to sketch his own approach:
Instead of inventing direct, "maximizing' criteria to suggest what the voters want, a more natural approach is to emphasize the data. By this I mean that we should try to find a way to use the information from the full profile to determine the will of the people.
Next he introduces NRR and NCR. In light of the discussion in my earlier piece 13 and in light of what we have discussed here, Saari's statements are puzzling. I have already commented on the 'maximization' bit. Characteristic of the axiomatic approach is that conditions of adequacy are argued for in advance of exploring individual rules. Once the axioms are in place, a theorem shows that they are consistent, or inconsistent, or characterizes the class of rules satisfying these conditions, and only those are considered "adequate." Yet this is precisely the approach that [t]hese numbers capture a sense of Saari's argument (…) that the majority vote statistically interprets the parts of a Condorcet n-tuple as coming from profiles consisting of cyclic voters where the indeterminate cyclic outcome is an appropriate conclusion. Rather than a natural tie, the majority vote introduces a cycle because it is trying to meet the needs of nonexistent cyclic voters! As Saari has argued, the indeterminacy problem and all difficulties where the majority vote and Condorcet proposal distort the wishes of the voters arise only because the majority vote mistakenly interprets the Condorcet configuration as being the contribution of nonexistent votes with cyclic preferences.
Let me explain in different words what I think is going on. Suppose three persons must rank A, B, and C. Suppose, again, that two individuals support "A over B," one supports "B over A," two "B over C," one "C over B," two "C over A," and one "A over C." Different remarks apply if we use majority rule introduced in section 1, or the Condorcet proposal. Suppose we use majority rule. Then a cycle emerges, which Saari thinks is appropriate in 80% of all cases leading to these results, but not when we have a Condorcet triplet: in that case the intuitive outcome is a tie (as Borda delivers it). Yet no tie emerges because "the majority vote mistakenly interprets the Condorcet configuration as being the contribution of nonexistent votes with cyclic preferences."
Suppose we use the Condorcet proposal. Saari thinks this example shows that the Proposal is flawed since it uses information about majority votes on pairs that are "parts" of a Condorcet n-
tuple. Yet it should disregard such information, since the best explanation for the occurrence of those votes is that they are generated by individuals some of whom have cyclical preferences, which makes it dubious that the outcome should be a ranking (as presupposed by the Proposal). I only discuss Saari's claim about what these phenomena entail for the Proposal.
Saari's argument challenges the applicability of the Proposal only if we have reason to think that voters have irrational (non-transitive) preferences. That may happen in two ways.
Either (a) we know the preferences and that some are cyclical, or (b) we only know the results of pairwise voting and it is likely that the relevant pairwise results derive from cyclical preferences. 15 As I put it in my earlier piece, in ideal theory, Saari's insights discredit the Condorcet proposal "no more than the fact that a decision reached by expected-utility reasoning may also have been reached by drawing lots (if only the right physical conditions hold that make one lot come up rather than another) or by following the Roman technique of observing the flight of birds (if only we have the right kind of weather for their flight to suggest a certain decision) discredits expected-utility theory" (p 719). cyclical group outcomes should not be by definition excluded as collective outcomes, as the Proposal does. We should worry if, as condition (b) stipulates, voting results are best explained by the presence of irrational voters. There are other ways of dealing with that problem, but one simple way is to ask voters to submit rankings rather than pairwise votes, so that the procedure can extract views on pairs from the rankings. This is legitimate given that Borda must ask for rankings, and given that the fact that the Proposal uses only pairwise votes has no methodological or epistemological virtues that would be undermined if we asked voters for rankings. Such questions, however, must be settled in concrete settings. Saari's cases, like his school example in 2.4, tremendously increase our understanding of problems that may arise when the Proposal is put into practice. One source of trouble is that the Condorcet proposal does not presuppose that preferences are transitive, but fails to be intuitively reasonable if they are not. Saari's examples are valuable for providing such insights. But that is their major accomplishment. Again, such insights are friendly amendments, not objections. . In other words, using the pairwise vote with a Condorcet profile differential has the effect of dismissing, for all practial purposes, the crucial assumption that the voters are rational. Instead (…), the parwise vote treats the Condorcet n-tuple (…) as though the votes are cast by non-existent, irrational voters." To the extent that Saari and Merlin speak about majority rule as defined in section 1, they confirm that that rule should not be taken to capture majoritarian decision making. If they speak about the Condorcet proposal, we must consider that the proposal asks which rankings are best supported by pairwise votes, and we must consider differences between ideal theory and applied settings. The implications of these points are spelled out in 3.4. Cf. also Saari, Chaotic Elections (Providence: American Mathematical Society, 2001), chapter 5, in particular section 1.6, and "Mathematical Structure of Voting Paradoxes," Economic Theory 15 (2000): 1-53, in particular sections 6 and 8.
Conclusion
Let me sum up. The multiplicity thesis emerges strengthened from this discussion. Recall that my claim is that, if we aggregate ordinal rankings, both the Borda count and the Condorcet proposal are reasonable rules. I argued this point in my earlier piece by rehearsing arguments for the Condorcet proposal and by showing that the defender of the Borda count can make a parallel case. Much of section 3 adds to that argument, and section 2 shows that Saari cannot independently discredit the Condorcet proposal. So the fact remains that, in democracy, some people will be "losers" although they would not have been had another, equally reasonable decision rule been adopted. As I argue in my earlier piece, this does not affect common justification of democracy.
What about the claim that majoritarian democracy is "conceptually sound?" What I take that to mean is that majoritarian democracy is coherent, and I think this follows from my arguments for the claim that the Condorcet proposal is what we should mean by majoritarian decision making. Saari does not dispute that claim, but still thinks that majoritarian democracy is conceptually flawed. What he means, I gather, and what he takes other critics, like Hardin, to mean, is that majoritarian decision making captured either by majority rule (as introduced in section 1), or by the Condorcet proposal is implausible (cf. p 346 of Saari's article). I have argued that it is not, at least as long as we restrict ourselves to aggregating rankings. It becomes implausible under those circumstances under which the Borda count does as well. Vis-a-vis defenders of the Borda count, majoritarian democracy does just fine. While arguing all this, I
submitted some ideas about how to reason about group decision making in the first place. I hope these proposals trigger more debate.
